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Abstract
The Tax-to-GDP ratio is an important tool for both economists and policymakers. Despite its
pivotal role, this indicator is measured and analyzed without due attention to the potential
biases stemming from the so called non-observed economy. This note aims at filling this gap,
pointing out the effects of untaxed and undeclared incomes on both sides of the Tax-to-GDP
ratio.
The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily reflect the views of the ISAE.
Citation: Bovi, Maurizio, (2008) "Measuring Tax Burdens in the Presence of Non Observed Incomes." Economics
Bulletin, Vol. 5, No. 10 pp. 1-6
Submitted: January 9, 2008.  Accepted: March 11, 2008.
URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2008/volume5/EB-08E60011A.pdf 
   
 ,QWURGXFWLRQ 
 
From both national and international perspectives, to understand tax reforms or to evaluate 
tax policies it is necessary to go beyond statutory rates. In fact, due to the complexity of tax 
credits, exemptions, deductions, etc., statutory rates bear little relation to rates actually paid. 
This is why tax ratios derived using aggregate data have attracted increased attention from 
policymakers  and  analysts  as  a  possible  approach  to  proxy  tax  burdens.  The  literature 
estimating this kind of implicit tax rates (Mendoza HWDO, 1994; OECD, 2000; de Haan HWDO, 
2001;  Carey  and  Rabesona,  2002),  focuses  on  relating  actual  tax  payments  to  the 
“corresponding” national account tax base. It usually deals with implicit tax rates on capital, 
labor, etc, emphasizing several  FDYHDWV (“all current measures reviewed have at least some 
important  shortcomings.”  OECD,  2000,  p.  3).  De  Haan  HW DO  (2001)  have  redone  the 
empirical analyses of studies in which average effective tax rates (AETR) have been used. 
They show that a more refined approach to national account aggregates leads to different 
AETR and to opposite findings. In contrast, when addressing the overall Tax-to-GDP ratio 
the literature underrates measurement issues. Surprisingly, no work sufficiently recognizes 
that even so highly aggregate figures may be seriously flawed.   
Against this backdrop, we argue that the interpretation of overall AETR may suffer from 
severe drawbacks when there is a significant share of non observed economy (NOE) – that is 
illegal, informal and underground activities
1. The reason why even the proxy of the overall 
tax burden may be misleading is twofold. First, a significant share of NOE is a fact of life all 
over the world (Schneider and Enste, 2000). Second, NOE incomes affect both side of the 
ratio because they shrink government revenues and hamper the reliability of GDP estimates
2. 
Previewing  one of the proposed  considerations, everybody should agree that  only honest 
taxpayers pay taxes. Accordingly, the Tax-to-GDP ratio should be computed making use of 
declared incomes only.   
From  the  practical  point  of  view,  obviously,  the  main  problem  when  addressing  “NOE-
correct” AETR is to gather reliable estimates of the non observed incomes. In this note we 
take advantage of the peculiar Italian situation, which is a good case-study because of i) its 
non trivial share of tax evasion and ii) the availability of official (they are released by the 




                                                      
1 According to SNA93 (U.N. et al., 1993), illegal activities are productive activities i) forbidden by law or ii) which are 
usually  legal  but  carried  out  by  unauthorized  producers.  The  informal  sector  is  broadly  characterized  as  consisting  of 
production units with the primary objective of generating employment and incomes to the persons concerned and, as such, 
forms  a  part  of  household  unincorporated  enterprises.  The  underground  sector  represents  the  area  of  legal  production 
activities that are not directly observed due to reasons of an economic and/or statistical nature. The former are the activities 
carried out with the deliberate desire to avoid taxes, social contributions, etc. The latter are all those production activities that 




￿ ., the failure to fill out the administrative forms). Throughout this paper I will 
refer to underground economic activities as hidden, irregular, undeclared, etc. (but, obviously, illegal or informal). 
2 Due to the inclusion of the NOE production, at the end of 2006 Greece revised its GDP upward by 25%. Accordingly, all 
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￿ , Eastern European countries).      
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The  availability  of  estimates  of  regular  and  irregular  GDP  allows  computing  two  policy 
relevant versions of the overall backward-looking tax burden. We will call them USUAL and 
MAX. The former is the conventional Tax-to-GDP ratio based on the overall (regular plus 
shadow) GDP. The latter makes use of the declared income. While quantifications are not 
strictly  necessary  to  the  present  aim,  national  accounts  consistent  data  help  commenting 
conceptual issues. Table I collects the results of dividing total government revenues by the 
two




                                              Years       MAX     USUAL  EVASION                         
1992  48.03  40.59  15.80 
1993  50.52  42.25  16.80 
1994  48.34  40.24  16.50 
1995  48.93  40.12  17.10 
1996  50.69  41.83  17.00 
1997  52.56  43.21  17.70 
1998  50.58  41.75  16.80 
1999  51.04  42.54  17.00 
2000  51.00  42.29  16.90 
2001  50.12  41.93  17.50 
2002  50.08  41.41  16.20 
2003  50.59  41.97  16.70 
                                                   Source: author’s elaboration on Istat (GDP) and  
         OECD (Tax) data. MAX=Tax/regular GDP;  
         USUAL=Tax/overall GDP; EVASION=hidden  
         income as % of overall GDP; Tax=total tax revenues.  
            
      
Before examining the figures, the logic of this letter suggests to understand what really they 
can tell us. Given the two diverse estimates, a first question naturally arises – which is the 
most reliable indicator? On that it must be recalled that, at least for OECD countries, official 
estimates of GDP are worked out according to the SNA93 framework (U.N.  HW DO 1993). 
Thus, the overall GDP is likely to be exhaustive, that is NOE incomes inclusive. As the 
presence of a non trivial amount of tax evasion is a fact of life all over the world, it means 
that USUAL is less reliable
4 than MAX. Modifications in tax evasion levels affect differently 
                                                      
3 Istat releases two point estimates of hidden GDP (Baldassarini and Pascarella, 2003). The “minimum hypothesis”, which is 
surely economic underground and the “maximum hypothesis”, which amounts to the former plus a part that is an inextricable 
mixture of statistical and economic underground. In table 1 we use the former, more conservative, estimate. 
4 Although our approach is eminently macroeconomic, one may argue that an opposite conclusion is obtained if each agent 
hides the same share of income.  
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the two ratios. To the extent the overall GDP is really all-inclusive, a reduced tax evasion 
surely increases USUAL because it enlarges fiscal receipts without affecting the overall GDP 
(there  is  only  an  offsetting  switch  between  regular  and  irregular  incomes).  Under  the 
hypothesis  of  a  proportional  rise  in  revenues  and  regular  GDP,  instead,  the  tax  evasion 
cutback does not impinge on MAX. Different causes behind the tax evasion decline impact 
differently on the reliability of the two proxies. If, FHWHULVSDULEXV, there is less tax evasion 
due to an increase in the expected penalty and/or in the tax morale, then the positive variation 
recorded by USUAL is correct. Instead, wrongly, MAX remains constant. If, FHWHULVSDULEXV, 
the new situation stems from reduced statutory tax rates
5, MAX is biased but USUAL is even 
more  fallacious.  Opposite  results are  generated  by  a  tax  evasion  worsening.  What  about 
informal incomes? To the extent informal production is untaxed and included in the regular 
GDP, a greater share of informal activities implies a reduction in both the proposed tax ratios. 
While it is correct, it must be kept in mind that a part of GDP, which is legally excluded from 
the tax base, it is included in the proxy of the true tax burden.    
The analysis of the fiscal side of AETR adds further insights. Given that it is harder to hide 
consumption than income, indirect taxes are paid even by (income) tax dodgers
6. To the 
extent it is true the USUAL ratio, taking into account even hidden incomes, turns out to be 
less biased than MAX (which over-estimates the AETR on law-abiding citizens). Likewise, 
illegal incomes are (at least partly) spent in the legal sector. Thus, like irregular earnings, 
even them pay indirect
7 taxes. According to the SNA93, illegal activities should be included 
in GDP. Unlike other countries (HJ, the UK), however, in Italy they are not added (yet) to 
the overall GDP. All that implies that both versions of the Italian AETR are over-estimated – 
the denominator being unaffected, some government receipts are paid neither by regular nor 
by irregular incomes.  
All that considered, we  are tempted to say that  the  true  overall fiscal  pressure could lie 
somewhere between the two extreme ratios reported in table I. This latter show that the “NOE 
correction” is constantly as high as 20%, calling for a careful approach to common-wisdom 
figures. Their full-sample correlation is high, 95%, but decreasing (85% in the period 1998-
03). Clearly, the magnitude of these statistics depends on the volatility of NOE incomes 
which, therefore, should be taken into account. 

       
 &RQFOXGLQJ5HPDUNV
This  note  is  motivated  by  two  considerations.  First,  the  availability  of  reliable  and 
comparable estimates of tax burdens is fundamental in both political and economic circles. 
Second, the underground economy is immanent in economic systems. According to a recent 
                                                      
5 The hypothesis is that lower statutory tax rates imply greater revenues due to the more than proportional response in the 
declared tax base. Otherwise stated, the hypothesis is that we are in the decreasing part of the Laffer curve. 
6 To the extent it is easier to tax consumption than incomes, a clear normative message emerges for revenue-maximizing 
governments – in the presence of a significant share of NOE, it is better to resort to indirect than to direct taxes.    
7 In fact, one should virtually take into account the fact that GDP estimates include only illegal activities with mutual 





















￿ , all illegal incomes 
spent “regularly” pay indirect taxes. Therefore, even a switch between illegal activities may affect the Tax-to-GDP ratio.    
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survey (Schneider and Enste, 2000), even OECD countries are operating with a significant 
and long-lasting share of hidden GDP (15% in the last decades). Complementing the existing 
literature, I have focused on the main conceptual and practical difficulties encountered in the 
measurement of ex post overall tax rates in the presence of undeclared incomes. Although I 
dealt only with system-wide items, it should be noted that the proposed reflections may shed 
some light even on labor/consumption tax rates.  
Needless  to  say,  gathering  reliable  estimates  of  NOE  incomes  is  a  very  complex  task. 
Nevertheless, difficulties should not lead to minimize the effects of undeclared activities on 
pivotal  indicators  such  as  AETR.  Data  for  Italy  suggest  that  acritically  referring  to  the 
conventional measure of the Tax-to-GDP ratio could be significantly misleading.       
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